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Introduction 
Over the last few years there has been increasing mention of the financing problems 
facing farmers. Whenever they are asked to list their problems, lack of credit is usually 
high on the list. As a result all the government recent policy documents have raised the 
issue and pledged to do something to address it.  
 
In the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2001-2004 agriculture was ranked as the number 
one  sector,  crop  development  the  priority  sub-sector  and  inefficient  rural  financial 
systems the second most binding constraint. Government noted farmers and the rural 
sector cannot progress without the credit and financial services they have been starved of, 
and committed to promoting an innovative an efficient rural finance and credit supply 
system for smallholders and rural primary processors by developing modalities to support 
schemes through farmer organizations, NGO’s, CBO’s, rural SACCOs, input suppliers 
and processors. The practical details, institutional and policy arrangements were to be 
worked  out  before  large  amounts  of  public  money  are  channeled  into  particular 
institutions.  
 
In the Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation poor access to 
farm credit is given as a cause of the decline in agricultural productivity. Government 
commits  to  review  the  institutional  framework  with  a  view  to  encouraging  the 
development of institutions that are well placed to provide credit to agriculture including 
micro-finance institutions and the revival of the Agricultural Finance Corporation.  
 
The Strategy for Revitalization of Agriculture also picks up on the agricultural credit 
problem. In its analysis of the problems facing Kenyan agriculture it states 
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  !"￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ "￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ #￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ $￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿%
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ &￿￿￿ ￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿  ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿%￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ’ ￿
￿
The President in his foreword to the document declares that in order to facilitate the 
needed  transformation  of  the  agricultural  sector,  establishment  of  market  based 
agricultural credit and inputs system is one of 5 critical areas requiring public action to 
modernize agriculture.  
 
The new government found many agricultural problems waiting for it. The Minister of 
Agriculture  formed  Task  Forces  to  look  into  the  problems  in  the  sugar  and  coffee 
industries. The sugar task force found Ksh 7.5 billion of debt to the Sugar Development 
Fund of which Ksh 2.5 bn was in arrears. The industry has Ksh 2.5 bn of arrears to the  
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Levy and Ksh 1.8 bn of arrears owed to farmers. The problems in the sugar industry are 
intimately  related  to  the  way  the  industry  is  financed.  Farmers  are  financed  through 
outgrower companies, local monopolies that charge relatively high rates per operation 
and  uncompetitive  interest  rates.  If  the  Sugar  Development  Levy  Fund  were  able  to 
develop modalities that give growers freedom to choose competitive service providers, 
then  their  cost  of  production  would  be  brought  down  and  the  sector  made  more 
competitive.  
 
The Coffee Task Force found Ksh 10.5 billion of debts owed by farmers and Ksh 1.2 bn 
owed  by  farmers  institutions  to  commercial  banks  and  multilateral  lenders.  They 
proposed a mix of debt write off and restructuring and Ksh 5 bn of new money that is 
needed to rehabilitate the industry. Many of the problems in the coffee sector stem from 
the lack of choice as to marketing channels, either at the local cooperative society level, 
or at the national level where all coffee must go through a central auction. Private treaty 
sales  of  coffee  could  encourage  international  buyers  to  pre-purchase  and  pre-finance 
production of part of Kenya’s coffee crop at very low interest rates. 
 
The mixture of incomplete liberalization and lack of competing marketing channels is a 
result of difficulties in agricultural financing. Too often farmers finance processors e.g in 
pyrethrum where the monopoly board owes growers Ksh 1 bn for unsold products and in 
the milk market. The only positive and problem free sector is small-holder tea where the 
KTDA handles an annual Ksh 1.5 bn fertilizer loan program to 360,000 growers without 
problems. A well-organized output market has resulted in tea growers being inundated 
with offers of credit from commercial banks, building societies, and cooperatives.  
 
Clearly financial issues are a large part of the problems facing the agricultural sector. The 
reaction of the private commercial banks has been to avoid agricultural lending, and the 
reaction of the new government, initially at least, was the funding of AFC and an effort to 
revive the Guaranteed Minimum Return scheme. However this paper argues that a lot 
more research and reflection is needed before public funds are committed to fulfilling 
election promises in ways that cannot be sustained. The government commitment made 
in the PRSP combined with the Presidents statement in the Strategy for Revitalization of 
Agriculture  is  to  take  the  time  to  work  out  details  of  market  based  solutions  to  the 
agricultural credit problem in Kenya. This paper is an attempt to begin that process.  
 
The paper gives a brief description of the history and main institutional forms in the 
agricultural and rural financial services sector – commercial banks, the micro-finance 
industry, savings and credit cooperative societies, village banks, building societies and 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation. It ends by raising some of the issues that need to be 
addressed as we begin to deal with the institutional and regulatory framework for the sub-
sector  including  the  cost  of  funds  and  the  array  of  existing  policy  and  legislative 
proposals on the table. The main argument of the paper is that we need to step back and 
undertake a comprehensive assessment of the sector before government passes new laws, 
or spends public money in unproductive ways. The paper proposes that the agriculture 
sector  ministries  should  play  a  leading  role  in  pushing  for  that  comprehensive 
assessment. For the sake of their underserved clients.     ￿ 
Tegemeo Rural Finance Paper 2004.  3
Commercial Banks 
At the end of 2003 Kenya has 51 banking institutions. 43 of these are commercial banks, 
2  non-bank  financial  institutions,  2  mortgage  finance  companies  (holding  30,000 
mortgages  in  a  country  with  5  million  households)  and  4  building  societies.    These 
institutions have 500 branches between them, 440 belonging to commercial banks, 39 in 
building  societies,  18  mortgage  company  branches  and  each  non-bank  financial 
institution has a single branch. The bulk of these outlets are in Nairobi.  
 
The banking sector has a total of approximately 1, 910,000 accounts. 73 percent of these 
are held by the 5 biggest banks as indicated in Table 1.  Total deposit liabilities of the 
banks held in these accounts is Ksh 378 billion. 
   
Table 1. Client Accounts at the Major Banks 
Bank  Client Accounts  Of which Businesses 
Barclays  495,000  30,000 
KCB  353,000  45,000 
National Bank  250,000   
Standard Chartered  150,000  25,000 
Co-Operative Bank  150,000   
  1,398,000   
Source: Authors communication with staff 
 
The banking sector currently is extremely liquid. Net deposit liabilities of Ksh 378 Bn as 
at December 31, 2003 are matched by liquid assets of 186 Bn. The statutory minimum 
liquid  assets  is  Ksh  75  Bn  implying  Ksh  110  bn  that  should  be  being  lent  out  to 
productive uses. The excess liquidity amounts to 30 percent of deposit liabilities.  
 
Most  banks  continue  to  hold  large  amounts  of  government  paper  at  extremely  low 
interest  rates  while  agriculture  and  the  rural  sector  are  starved  of  credit  and  other 
financial services. Put another way the commercial banks have Ksh 100 bn of deposits 
they wish they did not have lying in low performing instruments. Some are reportedly 
considering  charging  for  holding  deposits  and  taking  active  measures  to  discourage 
further customer deposits. Deposit interest rates below 1 percent do not seem to have 
done the trick.  
 
Given the excess liquidity and lack of borrower demand for loans, banks have launched a 
slew of new products in the recent past. Unsecured consumer loans has been the most 
effective of these in terms of generating good interest income on the back of high interest 
rates. A large number of banks have also entered new lines such as insurance premium 
financing, car loans and mortgages. A number are reportedly thinking about, but not sure 
how, to lend to agricultural trade, and ultimately to production agriculture.  
 
Many banks have been generating profits on charges for bank services.  Central Bank and 
government have managed to lower income from interest on government paper. Recently 
CBK moved to publish bank fees and charges in the press. Government has stated clearly 
that banks job, and main source of income should be from loans.  
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The  large  commercial  banks  have  not  been  idle.  In  the  last  year  Barclays,  Standard 
Chartered and KCB have all launched products directly targeting agriculture. Barclays 
has the most ambitious venture in the form of a Structured Commodity Finance product 
currently targeting large-scale wheat producers. The product supports the financing needs 
from land preparation through to storage and final sale of the commodity. It depends on 
the services of a managing agent dealing directly with growers on behalf of the bank, 
actuarial analysis of yield and drought risk, GPS and monthly visits, crop insurance and 
warehouse receipts. 25,000 ha have been lined up for the coming season.  Barclays is 
building the product on the back of experience gained in South Africa and Zimbabwe as 
well as with organized small-scale tobacco producers in Malawi.  
 
KCB have a new product called Mavuno. This allows farmers to be advanced credit 
against any produce already delivered to a reputable buyer. It gets around the problem of 
farmers waiting to get paid. It mirrors products being offered by building societies and 
co-operatives to tea and dairy producers that are described later in the paper.  
 
The biggest untapped market for credit is in the rural and agricultural sector. Commercial 
banks spoken to recognize this and are looking for ways of getting into that market. 
However the needs are far beyond what any single group of institutions has been able to 
do thus far. The rest of this paper describes some of the institutions active in the rural 
areas  and  in  agricultural  lending.  This  information  will  assist  government  and  the 
financial sector, develop ways of increasing the flow of funds to these key sectors.   
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A Brief History 
    
The  global  depression,  drought  and  locusts  were  among  the  poor  conditions  jn  the 
agricultural sector in the 1930’s that led to a freeze on agricultural lending by commercial 
banks in Kenya. Government responded in part by forming a Land Bank that lent credit 
on  concessional  terms  to  European  settlers.  Government  also  established  commodity 
marketing  boards  e.g  Wheat  Ordinance  1933  that  pooled  all  wheat  produced  to  be 
marketed by the KFA. Maize shortages in 1941 led to the Increased Production of Crops 
Ordinance in 1942. This allowed farmers to submit a cropping plan and be assured a 
minimum price for their production as well as insurance against unavoidable crop failure 
(i.e. through no fault of the farmers e.g. through sub-optimal husbandry practices). The 
government promise to buy a fixed sum at a fixed price was the Guaranteed Minimum 
Return  that  was  collateral  against  farm  input  advances  and  loans  from  private  and 
government sources. The Ordinance of Maize Control (1942) made KFA the sole legal 
buyer. With price and yield risk eliminated, production increased. 
 
In the post independence period government maintained policies conducive to suppliers 
of agricultural credit. The Agricultural Finance Corporation, AFC was the government 
main channel for advancing credit to producers with 5 acres or more. Private commercial 
banks were required to have at least 17 percent of their loans going to the agricultural 
sector.  The  network  of  national  cooperative  and  parastatal  organizations  were  a  key 
element in the post-independence credit system. The Kenya Co-operative Creameries was 
the sole monopoly buyer of milk, the Maize and Wheat Boards (later NCPB) covered the 
cereals, KTDA in tea, and the Coffee Board and KPCU in coffee, a monopoly pyrethrum 
board  and  monopsonistic  sugar  factories  all  thrived.  Government  controlled  prices, 
import and foreign exchange controls kept imports at bay, and rules and regulations kept 
private sector competitors from destabilizing the cosy arrangements.  
 
 Liberalization of the economy came in 1992 with the lifting of foreign exchange and 
import controls, and the freeing of many agricultural sectors from regulated monopolies. 
The process moved at different paces in different commodities, but overall, by the mid 
1990’s agricultural markets were largely liberalized.  
 
Liberalization  brought  havoc  to  the  institutional  arrangements  that  supported  the 
agricultural credit system. In maize for example, AFC would advance a mix of money 
and materials to growers. Advances in the form of farm inputs were collected from the 
large  quasi-government  Kenya  Farmers  Association  (later  KGGCU)  that  stocked  all 
agricultural inputs ranging from fertilizer and seed, to farm machinery and diesel. The 
advances were secured against a promise that the produce would be sold to the NCPB, 
and that NCPB would pay the farmers less the loan plus interest that would be remitted 
directly to AFC by NCPB. When farmers sold in side markets to private buyers rather 
than  NCPB,  or  when  AFC  failed  to  remit  funds  to  KGGCU,  the  system  quickly 
collapsed.  
 
Many,  but  certainly  not  most  farmers  had  access  to  these  arrangements.  They  were 
limited to relatively large producers of cereals and dairy in the Rift Valley and milk  
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producers in parts of Central Kenya. When funds were in short supply, as was the case in 
the mid to late 1990’s one needed, in addition, to be politically well connected.  
 
The post independence 17 % quota was never effective or enforced. In the mid 1990’s 
large banks reduced their presence in rural areas closing branches. The reduction in the 
rural branch networks of major banks further reduced access across Kenya not just to 
credit,  but  also  to  basic  financial  services  like  savings  and  checking  accounts.  The 
Central Bank allowed the closure of rural branches, and encouraged consolidation of the 
banking industry in pursuit of a vision of universal banking where one set of capital 
requirements and ratios was to be applied to all banks, non-bank financial institutions 
were  encouraged  to  convert  to  banks,  and  meet  high  and  rising  minimum  capital 
requirements. The CBK plan announced minimum capital requirements rising from Ksh 
150  million  to  Ksh  500  million  in  a  period  of  4  years.  The  current  government  has 
reversed the trend and set Ksh 200 million as the minimum capital of a fully fledged 
commercial bank. CBK and government are also exploring the possibilities of a multi 
tiered banking system.  
 
A Micro-finance Bill has been on the desk of the Minister of Finance for the last 3 
months. The proposed legislation would allow the micro-finance institutions that have 
mushroomed and provide credit to small businesses to be regulated and to take deposits 
from  the  public.  The  Ministry  of  Cooperatives  is  sponsoring  2  draft  bills,  one  for 
cooperatives in general that has 2 clauses relating to SACCOs and a separate piece of 
SACCO specific legislation. One of the aims of this paper is to inform the process of 
making  policy  in  the  financial  sector  with  an  eye  on  improving  access  to  financial 
services - savings as well as credit- to agriculture in particular, and the rural population in 
general. The focus will be on how to improve access for the relatively poor rural Kenyan 
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Current Access To Financial Services 
Tegemeo  has  been  undertaking  rural  household  surveys  for  a  number  of  year. 
Information from those surveys provides a snapshot of the current access to financial 
services among rural Kenyans disaggregated by a number of parameters of interest e.g. 
by  income  class,  household  demographics,  and  geographical  zone.  However  the 
information summarized in the table below suggests that is really the regional dimension 
that is the driver of policy relevant lessons from the household data.  
 
Households were asked a number of questions about their access to financial services. On 
the credit side most common sources were relatives, merry go round groups, the local 
shopkeeper, co-operatives, banks, and AFC in that order. Information on access to in the 
form of a bank account is summarized below.  
 
Table 2: Access To Financial Services: Any Type of Account 
 
The  agricultural  sector,  particularly  the  dominant  small-scale  sector,  is  starved  of 
financial services. An estimated 77 percent of Kenyan households have no access to 
financial services. And the average distance to a financial institution by those with some 
form of an account was 20.5 kilometers in the sample. The financial service need of 
households is savings products- a safe place to keep or accumulate small amounts of 
money that may come their way so that they can meet large and lumpy expenditures or 
emergencies – are not being met. Many agricultural operations even on small farms are 
relatively lumpy, whether it be tractor ploughing, paying people to plant or weed, or 
buying a bag of fertilizer. Lump sums are unlikely to be accumulated when the nearest 
institution  is  20  km  away.    This  is  part  of  the  cause  of  low  productivity  and  high 
production  costs  in  Kenyan  agriculture  as  farmers  cannot  accumulate  the  resources 
required to undertake optimal operations for which the technology exists and they are 
aware  of.  This  phenomena  is  clearly  recognized  by  government  as  reflected  in  the 
recently launched Strategy For Revitalizing Agriculture. 
 
 There has been a flurry of activity in setting up micro-finance institutions in Kenya to 
meet the financial needs of the majority of citizens. However after 25 years their total 
client base is in the range of only 200,000 of Kenya’s 5 million households. 
Where Held
Zone   Bank Account    SACCO/Co-op Post Office SB
% w/acc 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997
Central Highlands 92 22 31 67 58 3 2
Western Highlands 56 7 9 41 35 9 8
H Potential Maize Zone 53 37 45 10 6 7 6
Western Transitional 50 28 31 19 16 4 3
Marginal Rain Shadow 42 28 2 7 5 7 2
Eastern Lowlands 39 17 23 1 1 22 16
Coastal Lowlands 27 18 21 1 - 8 5
Western Lowlands 22 14 20 1 2 7 9
53 23 22 8
Average Distance 20.5 Km 
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 Some parts of the country are better off in terms of access to financial services than 
others. In the Central Highlands the SACCO movement has played a big role in getting 
financial services to the people on the back of tea, coffee, and dairy co-operatives. 92 
percent of households in the region have access to some form of a bank account. The 
table shows that SACCO’s and Cooperatives are the driving force behind that high figure. 
In the last 5 years the number of households having a co-op account has increased by 9 
percentage  points,  exactly  matching  the  decline  in  households  with  accounts  in 
commercial banks.  
 
For the rest of the country less that 50 percent of households have any form of account 
giving an average across the country of 23 percent. The strength of co-ops in the Central 
Highlands is also reflected in the western highlands (Kakamega and Kisii) driven by the 
growing of similar anchor crops that made co-ops popular in central – dairy, coffee, 
pyrethrum and tea.   
 
The cooperative movement seems never to have taken off in the 3 lowland zones. The 
result is only one percent of households in each zone having a coop account, probably 
related to a salaried job. In those areas accounts with commercial banks dominate.   
 
Only 23 percent of the Tegemeo sample had an account in a bank, a figure that is down 
on 1997 as banks close branches, and raise opening and minimum balances and monthly 
charges. At Ksh 400 per month, a simple savings account in a commercial bank is out of 
reach of even many salaried Kenyans. Stories abound about old people who laft a few 
thousand  shillings  in  their  accounts  and  came  some  months  later  to  find  no  money, 
negative balances or closed accounts. Inconvenient hours, distance from where people 
are, high transactions costs, the need to be literate and to speak the language officers 
understand, unhelpful staff attitudes and an intimidating appearance targeting upper and 
middle class are some of the reasons given by respondents for the unpopularity of banks. 
The near impossibility of getting a loan was also a factor and helped make alternatives 
like MFI’s and cooperatives popular.  
 
The  result  has  been  a  surge  in  the  number  and  client  base  of  alternative  financial 
institutions.  Savings  and  Credit  Co-operatives  with  front  office  service  activities  – 
FOSA- are mushrooming and now number over 100. There are accumulating and rotating 
savings and credit associations, and newly introduced Financial Service Associations – 
FSA- also known as village banks. But all these innovations are in need of enabling 
legislation to clarify their legal status and to set standards. Government has been slow to 
respond,  even  to  a  more  limited  micro-finance  bill  that  would  continue  to  exclude 
agricultural  households  from  financial  services.  No  institution  has  really  solved  the 
problems of how to get credit to the typical small-scale farmer outside of the major cash 
crop areas.  That is where large numbers of the poor live and survive without financial 
services,  let  alone  credit.  It  will  be  difficult  to  finance  the  needed  intensification  of 
agriculture in the absence of financial services. 
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Financial Sector Statistics 
Household survey data confirms that most households, particularly in certain relatively 
less well-endowed parts of the country, have no access to financial services. Table 3 
gives an indication of where those accounts are held.  
 
In total there are 1.4 million borrowers, 5.6 million accounts. Clearly the Post Office 
Savings Bank has the most account holders with active accounts accounting for almost 
half of all savings accounts in Kenya. POSB does not lend although there have been 
suggestions that the legislation that set it up be amended to allow it to make loans.   
 
SACCO’s hold 1.3 million of the 3 million remaining accounts with 6.5 times the number 
of accounts that have been mobilized by all the microfinance NGO’s and companies 
combined.  
 
Table 3.  Where the Accounts Are 
 Borrowers  Savers 
Post Office    2,010,000 
SACCO' s  1,000,000  1,300,000 
NGO' s   220,000   
Equity  60,000  253,000 
Commercial Banks  50,000  1,910,000 
K-Rep Bank  44,000  52,000 
Family Finance  18,000  60,000 
Co-op bank MFI  5,000  60,000 
     
  1,397,000  5,645,000 
Source Adapted from Dondo, K-Rep, 2003 
 
In terms of deposits mobilized the SACCO movement comes into a respectable second to 
commercial banks. The data in Table 4 below does reflects some double counting of 
deposits as the unlent funds of SACCO’s are held in bank accounts. But overall statistics 
confirm the picture that there is excess liquidity in the banking system. The problem for 
public policy is that at the same time the rural sector is starved of credit, rural agricultural 
producers cannot access these funds, and the few enterprises that do access credit do so at 
very high prices.  
 
Table 4. Where The Money Is 
  Ksh Savings  Ksh Loans Outstanding 
Banks  315,773,000,000  422,209,000,000 
SACCO' s  75,000,000,000  69,000,000,000 
Post Office  9,600,000,000  0 
Equity  3,200,000,000  1,800,000,000 
Family Finance  1,600,000,000  900,000,000 
NGO' s   1,300,000,000  2,211,000,000 
     
  406,473,000,000  512,320,000,000 
Sources: CBK Statistical Bulletin, Dec 2003, K-Rep 2003, authors communications  
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The Micro-finance Industry 
 
Kenya  has  62  micro-finance  NGO’s.  The  total  client  base  of  these  organisations  is 
220,000 mainly business people. They have demonstrated that micro-business lending in 
Kenya is feasible, and that small borrowers do pay. They have pioneered new product 
types  and  innovations  and  some  are  moving  toward  sustainability.  The  microfinance 
NGO’s have played an important part in moving government toward recognition of the 
small  borrower  and  have  been  instrumental  in  advancing  the  cause  of  the  proposed 
Micro-Finance Bill, that currently is on the desk of the Minister of Finance before being  
published and taken to parliament sometime in the coming parliamentary session in 2004.  
 
Table 5: The Major Microfinance Institutions 
Institution  # of Clients 
KWFT  75,000 
Faulu  24,000 
BIMAS  14,500 
SMEP  14,200 
WEDCO  12,000 
Micro Kenya  10,000 
ECLOF  6,500 
KADET  6,100 
Pride  6,000 
WEEK  5,000 
K-Rep D Ag  2,200 
Jitegemee  1,300 
SISDO  1,200 
   
Total  178,000 
 
Description of  the Institutions 
Kenya Women Finance Trust, the largest and oldest of the microfinance NGO’s was 
started in 1981 to advance and promote the direct participation of economically active 
women in viable businesses to improve their economic and social status by providing 
sustainable financial and non-financial services.  Loans are distributed through organized 
groups of 20 or so members who meet and save weekly or monthly, and must agree to 
use the group savings as collateral for individual loans to group members. The bulk of 
loans go toward business but KWFT also offers products to pay for school fees, and 
hospital bills. Loans are for durations of less than a year and are charged a monthly rate 
of 1.5 percent. Farmers, and the relatively poorer members of the community cannot 
access loans from KWFT.  The large numbers of institutions that have come into the 
Kenyan market since KWFT have basically similar products and conditions, do not lend 
to  agriculture  and  do  not  reach  the  poorest  members  of  society.  They  also  are  very 
concentrated in urban areas. 
 
Kenya  Women  Finance  Trust  is  a  registered  under  the  companies  act  as  a  company 
limited by guarantee. Small and Micro Enterprise Program –SMEP, Kenya Ecumenical 
Loans Fund – ECLOF, and the Jitegemee Trust also are companies limited by guarantee.   
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Faulu, WEDCO, and Micro Kenya are companies limited by shares. Business Initiative 
and Management Services BIMAS, Women Economic Empowerment-WEEK, KADET, 
K-Rep, PRIDE and SISDO are NGO’s. Dondo 2003 points out that Kenya MFI’s have 
diverse legal forms and are registered under at least 8 different Acts of Parliament.  
 
NGO MFI’s depend on donor funds to get started and to sustain their operations and 
significant amounts have come in since the documentation of the huge gap in access to 
finance among Kenyan MFI’s first documented in the USAID funded Microped project 
in  the  late  1980’s.  A  1999  study  noted  that  89  percent  of  SME’s  had  no  access  to 
financing from formal financial institutions. The MFI industry, and NGO’s within it have 
grown, but not enough to make a serious dent in these numbers. Total clients of all the 
MFI’s together is in the region of 220,000 clients in a market of over 1.3 million SME’s, 
and 3 million agricultural households. The 220,000 includes few whose main occupation 
is agriculture.  
 
The  Association  of  Micro-Finance  Institutions,  together  with  the  Micro-Finance  unit 
within  Central  Bank  are  convinced  that  regulation  through  a  Micro-Finance  Bill  for 
deposit  taking  MFI’s  would  help  increase  the  outreach  and  sustainability  of  MFI’s.  
Regulation would clarify some of the legal uncertainties MFI’s face, give the general 
public more faith in them, attract private investment capital that the industry needs and 
ensure good management and corporate governance. Most MFI’s depend on donor funds, 
so growth is limited by what can be accessed from that source. Recently donors have 
moved away from providing for the capital costs of MFI’s preferring capacity building 
and providing access to more commercial lines of credit. A clear regulatory framework 
could help attract private investor funds to the industry. There is need for more MFI’s and 
private investment would result in more individuals gaining access to a place to deposit 
money. Regulation in the Banking Act, has actively discouraged deposit taking MFI’s 
unless they are organized as cooperatives.      
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The Co-operative SACCO sector 
 
Cooperatives were introduced to Kenya in the 1930’s and recognized and controlled by 
government from 1931 when an ordinance to regularize their operations was first passed. 
In 1945 the Co-operative Ordinance Act was passed that is the predecessor of CAP 490 
of  the  Laws  of  Kenya,  the  current  Cooperative  Act.  That  act  was  amended  in  1997 
removing  much  of  the  control  the  government,  through  the  Commissioner  of 
Cooperatives, had over the movement.  
 
Subsequent events in the cooperative sector have led to the feeling that some of the 
controls and government oversight need to be reintroduced, but not to the pre 1997 level 
where a society or union could do almost nothing without the express written authority of 
the commissioner. The bureaucracy that process entailed created some of the problems in 
cooperatives. The proposed amendments aim to return a stronger supervisory role for 
government, but without the stifling and bureaucratic controls. The Act is currently under 
review with new amendments expected to come to parliament in 2004. The need for 
amendment of the 1997 Act has been recognized for many years. However cooperative 
leaders suggest that there is no demand from the side of cooperatives for review and 
suggest that it is the Cooperatives Department itself that is the main driving force behind 
the review.   
 
In December 2003 the Kenya National Federation of Cooperatives held a workshop in 
Mombasa to sensitize the Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture Lands and Natural 
Resources  –  that  covers  cooperatives-  on  their  reservations  about  the  draft    bill.  In 
discussions it came out that the cooperative movement has changed a great deal since the 
days when it was dominated by rural agricultural based co-ops. Today large employer 
based cooperatives dominate the movement and play a large role in the finance business.  
 
The  management  problems  the  Cooperative  Societies  Amendment  Bill  2003  was 
addressing refer more to small rural crop marketing based cooperatives. Provisions that 
allow the Commissioner access to audited accounts before members at their AGM, to 
remove the management committee, call special general meetings and set the agenda, 
carry out inspections at the cost of the society, and appoint commissioners to take over 
management were not acceptable to the typical cooperative of today that is a private 
financial institution in a competitive business. The movement also was not satisfied with 
the  provisions  related  to  setting  up  a  cooperative  development  fund  and  a  SACCO 
regulatory authority.  
 
The rules proposed in the draft bill may be appropriate for the typical troubled rural 
agricultural  marketing  cooperative.  Today  there  really  are  2  types  of  cooperatives  in 
Kenya. Their regulatory needs are quite different and they cannot be dealt with under one 
piece of very intrusive legislation.  
 
The draft bill had 2 clauses covering SACCOs.  However it was felt that the 2 clauses 
setting up a regulatory authority were inadequate to the regulatory needs of the industry.  
Uncertainty  exists  about  when  this,  as  well  as  hundreds  of  other  pending  pieces  of  
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legislation,  will  actually  get  to,  and  through,  parliament.  This  gives  time  for  more 
dialogue and reflection about the regulatory needs of SACCOs. The existence of a draft 
SACCO specific bill shows that government wishes to do something. But with an MFI 
draft, and 2 cooperative drafts as well as some disquiet about the Banking Act, it is a 
good time for reflection on how Kenya wishes to regulate the financial sector.  
 
Cooperative  societies  with  marketing  functions  have  always  maintained  back  office 
financial services functions related to making payments of proceeds to members. Some 
members  do  not  immediately  withdraw  all  of  their  proceeds.  This  meant  that  the 
institutions were effectively running withdrawable savings schemes.  
 
In 1982 the Cooperative Bank of Kenya encouraged the formation of Union Banking 
Sections  in  coffee  cooperative  unions  so  that  farmers  proceeds  from  sales  could  be 
channeled direct to farmers accounts, rather than into the accounts of their individual 
cooperative societies or factories. Mobile units of the UBS’s also went closer to farmers 
to  make  payments  for  their  proceeds.  These  accounts  also  allowed  the  World  Bank 
funded Cherry Advance Payments System to channel advances against cherry deliveries 
direct to farmers’ accounts. Previously, coffee farmers could access credit from their 
cooperative societies, but only in the form of farm inputs. In some cooperatives these 
advances could also be in the form of maize. Cooperatives also were able to assist their 
members keep their children in school either through making payments or in the form of 
a letter of undertaking stating that the parent was due to receive money some time in the 
future giving comfort to the school. 
 
Union banking sections grew very large in all the main coffee growing districts. Since not 
all growers withdrew all their payments at once, they also became very liquid. Many 
cooperative unions fell victim to the temptation to use the liquid cash in the UBS to cover 
some  of  their  general  expenses.  Fraud,  poor  accounting  and  other  management  and 
liquidity  problems  led  many  UBS’s  into  trouble.  Significant  effort  was  put  into 
converting UBS into independent, separate legal entities in order to safeguard members 
funds. This was resisted by the unions but the shift toward distinct Rural Savings and 
Credit Societies – SACCO’s was almost unstoppable. These SACCO’s offered a range of 
financial services, most significantly loans against members share capital. Over the years 
SACCO’s have thrived while their parent cooperative unions have struggled with many 
actually collapsing in the wake of marketing problems in their main commodities, most 
commonly coffee, milk and pyrethrum.  
 
Industry Statistics 
Currently  there  are 3,200 SACCOs in Kenya serving 1,300,000 savers and 1 million 
borrowers.
1  Many  of  these  are  urban  and  employment  based  with  the  largest  being 
Mwalimu SACCO serving teachers, and Harambee SACCO serving employees of the 
departments under the Office of the President whose assets run to Ksh 4.5 and 3.9 bn 
respectively. Although many of the loans they give may end up as investments in school 
fees and buildings in rural areas, they are not considered part of the rural finance sector 
that is the focus of this paper. However they help to illustrate how big the cooperative 
                                                 
1 Dondo, K-Rep 2003  
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SACCO movement has become. A few large cooperatives may bias average figures but 
simple calculations indicate the average SACCO has Ksh 25 million of deposits in 400 
accounts averaging Ksh 61,000 each. ¾ of those members will have borrowed an average 
of Ksh 64,000 each. To service these clients, rural as well as urban SACCO’s are opening 
Front Office Service Activities – FOSA- to serve as what for all intents and purposes is a 
bank  for  their  members.  FOSA  is  also  one  of  the  few  remaining  profitable  income 
generating business activity cooperatives can engage in. The law that allows them to take 
deposits gives them an advantage that may not last in the face of proposed regulatory 
changes. 
 
Descriptive Typology Of Rural SACCO’s 
There are 10,000 registered cooperatives in Kenya.  About 120 have opened front office 
services. In the rural sector 4 categories of SACCO with front office services can be 
identified based on fieldwork undertaken as part of this study.  
1. Large, old, usually based on former district wide cooperative union. More than 
10,000 members, can go over 100,000. 
2.  Medium sized fairly new, many based on tea 2-10,000 members 
3.  Small, newly launched front office activity to supplement income from decline in 
milk business, plus to service milk producers 
4.  Tiny, almost village banks, new activity, or NGO/developmental base.  
 
Table 6: Descriptive Typology of Rural SACCOs 
 

















Murata F  108,000    170.0  730.0  303.0  1,572  6,759   
Mumias OG  39,941    155.1  120.1  116.9  3,883  3,004  3,000 
Nyeri F  45,000    78.0  500.0    1,733  11,111   
Gusii  100,000    66.4  240.0  58.0  664  2,400  580 
Aberdare M  14,000    30.0  90.0    2,143  6,429   
Meru F  126,000               
                 
Murata B1  4,000  3,500  7.5  17.0    1,868  4,250   
Murata B2  7,500  5,000  14.9  57.9    1,987  7,720   
Kiegoi T  3,400    26.0  21.0    7,647  6,176   
Kisumu R  4,000    24.8    16.0  6,200    4,000 
Ol Kalou F  5,000    18.0  30.0  32.0  3,600  6,000  6,400 
Nyamira T  6,000    7.2  33.8  30.0  1,200  5,633  5,000 
Saga  4,454    3.4    3.4  763    754 
                 
Ndetika  1,998    35.0    39.0  17,518    19,520 
Muki  1,700      20.0  18.0    11,765  10,588 
                 
Nanyuki E  500    30.0    1.5  60,000    3,000 
Ainabkoi  693    5.6  1.0  5.1  8,081  1,443  7,417 
Akukurunut  517    1.6  1.0  0.8  3,095  1,838  1,451 
Source: Authors visits, records. Incomplete data unavoidable  
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In  the  very  large  rural  coops,  (Murata,  Nyeri  Farmers,  Meru  Farmers)  loans  are  an 
important part of the reasons for joining, but an examination of their operations and client 
balances  indicate  that  savings  is  actually  the  major  reason  members  use  the  service. 
Among  the  large  rural  coops  visited  savings  are  3  to  5  times  the  amount  of  shares 
reflecting relatively lower demand for loans. 
 
In the newer smaller coops (Ainabkoi, Akukurunut) the average member holds 2 to 5 
times  more  shares  than  savings  showing  that  those  who  join  new  coops  early  are 
relatively more interested in the ability to access loans. This is one of the reasons for 
more strict vetting of those setting up new deposit taking coops. Today it is very easy and 
needs approval of a single District Copoerative Officer who has very limited powers, 
inclination or skills, to oversee operations. 
 
The demand for savings services is also shown by the number of clients who are not 
members or shareholders. These typically are salaried people working in, but not from 
the area, such as policemen, and teachers and some business people. 
 
SAGA was a small operation based in Bondo that was able to reach the poorest clients 
seen during field investigations. It is managed by a private company, but the individual 
operating  units  are  cooperatives.  SAGA  acts  as  an  umbrella  of  the  rotating  and 
accumulating savings and credit groups common all over Kenya, but the only financial 
institutions in that relatively poor and remote district. ROSCA’s – rotating savings and 
credit associations - are the ubiquitous merry go rounds where people (most commonly 
women) meet weekly to save a small sum by giving the weeks savings to one of the 
members. ASCA’s - accumulating savings and credit associations – are less common but 
also meet weekly to save toward some lump sum e.g. cutlery or a water tank for each 
member. Both types of organization are informal and unregistered and use peer pressure 
to assist members maintain the discipline of saving.   
 
SAGA has opened a front office that is the equivalent of a village bank where members 
can save even very small amounts either as a group or individually. In very poor parts of 
Kenya they were able to raise large sums of deposits from apparently near destitute men 
and women. SAGA branches also were able to bring banking services to fishermen along 
the  shores  of  Lake  Victoria,  100  kilometers  from  the  nearest  commercial    banks  in 
Kisumu. Fishermen were saving and not consuming all of their income daily as they 
normally do. However the small banking facilities were having some problems getting 
credibility  with  potential  customers  following  previous  organisations  that  went under 
without refunding depositors. SAGA is majority owned by K-Rep and is an attempt to 
roll out financial services in poor and remote communities.  
 
Dividends and profits 
Most SACCO’s generate profits and pay dividends to members of between 2 and 6 % of 
the value of their shares. Provisions are made as not all the profits are paid out as 
dividends – usually only between ½ and 2/3 of profits are distributed. 
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Running costs, and management 
Staffing costs are the biggest cost in the running of cooperatives. Costs related to the 
boards  and  its  many  committees  come  second.  Cooperative  management  principles 
require elected board members to have a very big say in the day to day running of the 
societies. This is the source of some tension between boards and managers who feel 
overly constrained by the often relatively less educated board members who are their 
bosses. 
 
 This tension has played out in different ways in different coops. At one extreme qualified 
managers are forced out by politicized boards wishing to have more control for a range of 
possible reasons ranging from wanting to have a person from their own clan as manager 
(all coops were managed by people from the local tribe), to wanting opportunities to 
employ  relatives  or  to  misappropriate  funds.  In  a  number  of  co-operatives  this 
misappropriation is in the form of board members granting themselves loans they are 
subsequently unable or unwilling to pay. Working in coops was reported to be difficult 
due to politicization of appointments, and relatively low wages. 
 
The other extreme was where management was left to handle most normal management 
matters without interference from board members who only came for regularly scheduled 
meetings.  This  was  relatively  rare  as  the  cooperative  principle  demands  that  board 
members keep a close watch over society issues and day to day running. In many cases 
managers were better educated than board members. Rural based board members also 
have time on their hands with many of the more recent boards having been infiltrated 
with well educated former teachers and civil servants who have retired to their home 
areas. Every meeting at the society offices results in the payment of sitting allowances 
that range from Ksh 500 to 3000 among societies visited. 
 
Income sources 
The bulk of cooperative SACCO incomes comes from interest on loans. SACCO’s with 
front office services FOSA also make money from ledger fees, bankers cheques, and 
withdrawal  charges.  In  some  SACCO’s  with  FOSA  these  banking  related  charges 
generated as much or more income than actual loan interest. FOSA services are opening 
up all over the country as co-ops recognize it as one of the few profitable cooperative 
activities they can engage in after the decline of income from traditional cooperative 
marketing and input supply activities.  
 
Interest  charges,  sale  of  pass  books,  levies,  standing  charges  and  withdrawal  fees, 
penalties on loan defaulters, interest on investments e.g. fixed deposits and Treasury bills, 
cheque  clearance  and  loan  application  forms  are  the  primary  income  sources  for 




SACCO’s recruit members through sale of shares that are an investment for the members. 
These  shares  are  the  source  of  funds  for  lending.  Typically  members are allowed to  
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borrow between 2 and 5 times their shares. Societies lending 2 times are performing 
poorly and are liquidity constrained. 4 times shares is the most commonly occurring ratio.   
 
SACCOS offer a range of loan products with each one having its own unique products, 
terms or conditions. The following were the most common types of loans 
·  School fees: This is the most common accounting for between 60 and 80 percent of 
loans among societies visited 
·  Hospital Bill Loan- a quick disbursing product where the cheque is written to a 
medical facility 
·  Medium term loans – 3 years  
·  Development loans of 3-5 years 
·  Advance against agricultural produce payments 
 
SACCOs also mobilize savings 
 
Competition 
Competition among coops and between coops and other financial institutions is fierce. 
Within the coops there has been the rivalry between the large old district unions and 
newer separate rural SACCO’s. In the tea growing areas there has been competition with 
recently formed Tea SACCO’s that KTDA has been promoting to avoid having to carry 
monthly payments to thousands of growers on monthly basis in cash. The competition 
between SACCO’s is best seen in 3 examples.  
 
In Nanyuki 2 SACCO’s are in court as technically Nanyuki town falls outside Nyeri 
district (by 200 meters) but the 10 branch 45,000 member Nyeri Farmers SACCO has 
opened a branch there. Competition and the legal challenges is coming from the 500 
member, municipal council employee based Nanyuki Equator SACCO.  
 
In Karatina town, Mathira Division of Nyeri district there are 4 SACCOs’ with FOSA 
and 5 commercial bank branches all within 200 meters of each other. The SACCO’s are 
Nyeri Farmers SACCO Society that has branches in all the divisions of the district, Nyeri 
Tea Growers that is in the 3 tea growing divisions of the district, Mathira Tea Growers 
SACCO Society, and Mathira Tea and Dairy Farmers SACCO Society.  
 
In Maua Town in Meru North all commercial banks had pulled out by 1999. Meru North 
Farmers Cooperative Society that previously had a membership of 40,000 coffee growers 
opened a FOSA in the late 1990s. Among its clients are17,000 active accounts of which 
7,600 are tea farmers. Meru North has 3 branches, and 3 mobile units. More recently the 
tea farmer specific Keigio Tea Farmers SACCO opened in the town and has managed to 
get  3400  members.  The  largest  employer  in  the  town,  Maua  Mission  Hospital  also 
opened a FOSA primarily to ease the payment of salaries to staff. Services are also open 
to members of the public. Maua is a relatively large town in a busy commercial area that 
is  the  center  of  the  highly  liquid  multi-million  shillings  per  day  miraa  business.  It 
survived  the  closure  of  all  its  commercial  banks  through  these  cooperative  societies. 
Meru  North  Cooperative  assisted  the  miraa  business  by  opening  agency  branches  in  
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A number of key issues need to be addressed to consolidate the gains made by the vibrant 
SACCO sector. Key among them are issues of regulation. Following the Cooperative 
Societies  Amendment  Act  of  1997  the  Commissioner  of  Cooperatives  has  extremely 
limited control over the operations of SACCO’s or any other cooperatives. SACCO’s are 
the only non-banking institutions allowed to take deposits from members of the public. 
Currently Ksh 70 billion, as compared to 400 billion in the entire banking sector is in the 
hands of unregulated SACCO’s. There have been a number of SACCO’s that have gone 
under  unable to refund members their savings or shares. The biggest worry is if one of 
the bigger SACCO’s was unable to make good members withdrawals and there was a 
general loss of confidence in SACCO’s and mass withdrawals. Thousands of Kenyans 
would lose their savings. SACCO’s do not subscribe to any form of deposit protection. 
 
Central  Bank  has  stated  that  it  does  not  have  the  capacity  to  regulate  over  3,000 
SACCO’s and 100 plus FOSA’s. However they also recognize the need for some form of 
regulation,  and  suggest  a  regulatory  body  that  they  become  members  of,  but  do  not 
control i.e. regulation outside of the Banking Act. This would either be under a revised 
Co-operative Act, or under SACCO specific legislation. There is general agreement that 
some form of regulation is necessary not least to ensure SACCO’s meet and report on 
common prudential, and reporting standards to  an independent regulatory body. Issues as 
to  capital  adequacy,  ownership  and  governance,  lending  policies  and  risk  analysis, 
auditing and reporting audit findings, and qualifications of management are some of the 
areas where government driven regulation needs to be brought to bear.  
 
Today literally any group of 10 individuals can start a SACCO and begin mobilizing 
huge deposits from the public, and lending them almost as they wish. Debate about the 
form of cooperative legislation is currently ongoing. The Bill has been published and is 
scheduled to come to parliament in 2004. A microfinance bill introducing the concept of 
multi-tiered  banking  with  different  requirements  and  standards  for  different  types  of 
institutions also will be in parliament around the same time. Government still needs to 
decide if SACCO’s will be under cooperative, or microfinance legislation. They could 
also be brought under an amended Banking Act reflecting a global trend toward unified 
financial  sector  regulation.  Kenya  is  bucking  the  trend  by  continuing  to  propose  the 
creation  of  numerous  distinct  financial  sector  regulators  in  banking,  microfinance, 
SACCO’s, capital markets, retirements benefits etc.  
 
SACCO’s are a big industry, particularly in the parts of rural Kenya where there is, or has 
been, a remunerative cash crop. However in the bulk of the country where this is not the 
case,  SACCOs  have  not  penetrated  in  a  big  way.  Cooperative  SACCO’s  are  thus 
perpetuating the imbalance where better off parts of the country get better services and 
more choice. In the next section Village Banks, an endeavor to address this shortcoming, 
are examined.  
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Village Banks 
K-  Rep  Development  Agency  was  behind  importing  the  concept  of  village  banks  to 
Kenya. Officially known as Financial Services Associations (FSAs) their number has 
grown to just under 160 spread around relatively poorer parts of Kenya where there are 
no commercial banks or cooperative SACCOs. 75 of those are sponsored by K-Rep. 
Catholic Relief Services are the other big sponsor of village banks.  
 
Table 7 FSAs in the Districts Visited. 
District  # of FSAs/ Village Banks 
Kitui  5 
Taita- Taveta  9 
Kilifi  7 
Kwale  7 
Makueni  5 
Bomet  6 
Suba  2 
Migori  2 
Bondo  3 
Busia  1 
Butere/Mumias  1 
Total  48 
 
 
FSA’s are popularly known as village banks. They are community owned, through sale of 
shares to members. Each share costs Ksh 300 and members are not limited in terms of 
how many they can buy. Members can access loans worth a multiple of their shares with 
4 times share-holding being the most commonly occurring multiple. Loans are disbursed 
to members strictly from the share capital. In cases where savings have been loaned out, 
this  has  led  to  a  near  collapse  of  the  particular  village  banks  when  savers  wish  to 
withdraw  savings  and  the  liquid  funds  are  not  available.  Shares  cannot  easily  be 
withdrawn. 
 
Village  banks  operate  under  the  principle  of  ‘savings  first’  that  is  common  among 
microfinance institutions and SACCOs. Savings first implies that people actually need 
savings services more than loans. It also is used to develop the habits of putting aside 
regular amounts of money that is an important element in building the discipline required 
to repay a loan.  For many of the members of village banks the institution is their first 
opportunity  to  have  any  form  of  bank  account,  and  to  put  money  aside  outside  of 
revolving groups.  
 
FSA’s main service is actually savings as much as credit. By offering savings facilities to 
members  and  the  wider  community  (associate  savers)  FSA’s  are  able  to  make  the  
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financial dealings of community members much simpler, particularly for services such as 
check clearing, and writing checks for community members with no access to their own 
accounts  in  commercial  banks.  FSA’s  charge  for  these  services,  but  the  cost  o  the 
client/member is considerably lower than the cost of traveling to the next major town, or 
the cost of maintaining a bank account that is on the order of Ksh 250-500 per month and 
out of the reach of the poor majority.  Most FSA’s do not charge a fixed monthly fee, but 
charge per transaction, usually per withdrawal.  
 
FSA’s are community financed and community managed, and run by staff who come 
from the community. The language of business is the local one and business hours are as 
determined by the community. The same applies to service charges.  
 
As  a  result  of  the  locational  convenience  and  reasonable  charges  FSA’s  attract  non 
member clients who hold no shares but use the facility as a savings bank account. Most 
of  these  are  salaried  people  from  outside  the  area  such  as  teachers,  policemen  and 
business people. The product tailored for such individuals is called the associate savings 
scheme. An individual member or associate saver can access his/ her savings any time, 
within the stipulated working hours. The minimum balance is Ksh. 200 for members and 
Ksh. 400 for associate savers and a range of fees is charged on withdrawals.  
 
Each FSA develops its own loan products. However the most common are: 
￿￿Business loans for business startup or expansion  
￿￿School fees 
￿￿Medical/ emergency loans 
￿￿Development loans- to put up structures, business premises, houses. 
￿￿Consumption loan- to buy food or other needs. 
 
All loans taken are repaid within one year with repayment periods ranging from 4 to 12 
months. Members are free to negotiate shorter repayment periods. Usually this is done so 
as to qualify sooner for a larger subsequent loan. Loans are guaranteed by the shares of 
the loan recipient and those of 2 or more guarantors. Apart from the savings and credit 
scheme, FSAs offer cheque clearance and money transfer services to members. 
 
Table 8 Typical Charges among FSA’s 
Withdrawal Fees   
Amount (Ksh)  Charges (Ksh) 
20- 100  5 
101- 1,000  10 
1,001- 10,000  50 
10,001 and above  100 
   
Other sources of income  Ksh. 
Registration fees  100 
Passbook  60 
Loan application. Form  100 
Affidavit  10 
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Table 9.  Interest Rates charged by different FSAs 
FSA  Interest rates (%) p.a.  Penalty (%) on amount due/ day 
Nzambani  180 – 60  0.5 
Mathima  120  -  48  0.5 
Werugha  120 – 24  0.5 
Ngerenya  22 -  18   
Tiwi  20  0.05 
Makimenyi Bomet  16 – 22  0.10 
Rongo, Migori  14 – 25  0.08 
Magunga, Suba  16 – 30  0.10 
Mbita. Suba  15   
Bumala  14 – 25   
     
In case loan repayments are delayed, there is a penalty charged of 0.5 % per day or 15% 
per month, on the amount due. 
 
Organization of FSA’s 
For purposes of borrowing and co- guaranteeing, members are organized into groups of 
between 5 and 10 members, called Kikundi cha mkopo, (KCMs).  Several KCMs form a 
larger  group  called  Muungano.  The  Muungano,  appraises  and  approves  loans  to 
borrowers. The group members elect a chairman, secretary and treasurer to run the affairs 
of the KCM. The KCM meets regularly to save, and a member can save as little as Ksh. 
20 per week.  This is a mandatory group saving which will guarantee member loans.  The 
KCMs also put pressure on a member with a loan to make regular weekly repayments 
 
An 8 member Board of Directors, (BoD) oversees the running of the village banks. Board 
members  must  be  shareholders  and  go  through  a  democratic  election  process.  They 
cannot be politicians or from the provincial administration as this has in the past caused 
problems with loan recoveries. The board is composed of a chairman, 3 internal auditors, 
2 persons from the credit committee, and 2 bank signatories. The board must be at least 
one-third women.  
 
One manager, a loans officer, and a cashier, run the day-to-day affairs of the village bank. 
Activities  include  member  recruitment,  training,  loan  disbursement,  loan  recovery, 
accepting savings and paying withdrawals. A watchman who guards the premises is also 
part of the team. The community identifies suitable employees from the local area. The 
monthly wage bill in a typical FSA usually is less than Ksh 35,000 in a stand-alone FSA, 
Ksh 10,000 in a branch. Wages, including board members sitting allowances, constitute 
60 to 90 percent of running costs.  
 
The  community  contributes  towards  the  costs  of  starting  up  the  FSA.  If  there  is 
construction they cover  1/3  of cash costs with each member making a cash contribution 
of  Ksh  100  or  more.  They  also  contribute  building  materials  such  as  sand,  bricks, 
hardcore etc and provide some labor. K-Rep through funding by the Danish development 
agency Danida,  provides two-thirds of cash needs, a safe, stationery, help with marketing 
and outreach, training, and ongoing monitoring and external auditing services. There has  
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been mixed success in having FSA’s continue to run in the absence of some continuing 
external backstopping support.  The financial support required to set up a village bank is 
on the order of Ksh 200,000 excluding ongoing backstopping. 
 
The potential of FSA’s to improve lives in relatively marginal areas is apparently quite 
great. A few examples of help make the point. Perhaps the most striking was a lady 
member at the coast who held a single Ksh 300 share, borrowed Ksh. 1,200, 4 times her 
single share, to start a business in her house- selling paraffin, soap, cooking oil. In 2 
months, her business has doubled, she has increased her shares to 3 (worth Ksh 1,200) 
and grew her personal savings to Ksh. 2,000. 
 
Another member had an existing but poorly stocked retail shop. He took a loan of  
Ksh. 12,000 and split it between school fees - Ksh. 4,000, and business Ksh 8,000. In one 
month his business, stock, and profits had grown to more than enough to service the loan. 
Meanwhile his child stayed in school.  
 
FSA money is not cheap. Initially first loans were charged at 6 or 8 percent per month, 
the second at 5 percent. Term of such loans would be less than Ksh 5,000 over 3 or 4 
months.  Payments would be Ksh 1,550 per month for 4 months on the Ksh 5,000 loan so 
despite the high interest rate total interest paid would be a seemingly small Ksh 1,200 
over 4 months for the privilege of having Ksh 5000 in cash. On an annual basis the 
interest rate implied is 96 percent. But clients were happy to access the loan. Recently 
interest rates have been reducing driven by competition, and lack of demand for loans in 
some localities.    
 
FSA’s become more accessible because they take unique forms of collateral. Apart from 
shares and guarantees from other members, FSA’s take pledges of household assets – like 
radio  and  TV  sets,  sofa  sets,  tables,  bicycles,  livestock,  personal  pledges,  and group 
savings. For larger loans, usually above Ksh 10,000, the borrower must sign an affidavit 
with a commissioner of oaths, at a small extra cost. In case of default the provincial 
administration, usually in the form of the assistant chief and his administration policemen 
are used to attach pledged securities and encourage defaulters to repay their loans.  
 
Returns on Investment. 
Some of the village banks visited are moving toward sustainability and have been able to 
make  profits  from  their  operations.  Profits  are  shared  out  in  form  of  dividends  to 
shareholders. Excess money was invested in Treasury Bills when rates were high. Now 
FSA’s are under pressure to keep money loaned out as the returns to money in the bank is 
negligible. However they face the risk of deteriorating loan quality if the urge to lend 
overcomes the need for caution. However an FSA that does not lend cannot survive. This 
is part of the reason for recent declines in interest rates charged. The problems of running 
an FSA are the same as for any financial institution around the world.  
 
Well run FSA’s have been able to show markedly improved performance from year to 
year and some may soon become  self sustaining. Members are particularly pleased when 
they get a dividend on their shares and committees compete to generate high dividends.   
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However this has to be balanced against the need to retain earnings and build the capital 
base of the institutions. Table 7 shows dividend payout in select FSA’s per Ksh 300 
share.  
 
Table 10. Dividend Payout in Selected FSA’s 
FSA  Year  Earnings/ share  Dividends  Retained Div. 
Nzambani- Kitui  2001  9  0  0 
  2002  70  28  60 
Werugha- Taita- Taveta  1999  87.5  0  70 
  2000  175  72  70 
  2001  195  78  70 
  2002  301.25  78  128 
Makimenyi  2002  50  0  50 
 
FSA’s face a number of challenges. Initially FSAs started lending to individuals but high 
default  rates  resulted  in  the  near  closure  of  some  of  the  pioneers.  The  group  co- 
guaranteeing  system  was  introduced,  and  has  been  quite  effective  in  loan  recovery. 
However it is a disincentive to more established business people and many FSA clients 
may, as a result, graduate away from the FSA to other types of financial institutions. 
Given the development objective of FSA’s this is not a bad thing.  
 
FSA’s also face marketing challenges. Some have difficulties in recruiting new members 
due to competition from other micro-finance institutions that offer similar services, using 
the group co- guaranteeing system, as well as merry- go- rounds. High interest rates, 
ranging between 24% and 180% p.a also have proved a problem. However, in most 
FSAs,  there  is a dramatic decline in interest rates, in each of the first few years of 
operation  in  order  to  keep  loan  demand  high.  Most  FSA’s  are  short  of  borrowers. 
Members avoid taking loans due to fear of losing property in case of failure to service 
the loan. 
 
 Low skill levels in FSA communities also has been a problem that manifests in low 
management capacity in the staff and the governing boards. However those skills are 
being built up and FSA’s do have a developmental goal. The FSAs have moved quite 
slowly away from dependence on the promoting sponsor K-Rep. On the management 
side fraud due to lack of close supervision of management staff, tedious manual daily 
transactions, and lack of electricity and computers have been a concern.  
 
FSA’s have not been able to make many loans to agriculture and recognize it as one of 
their shortcomings. Business and school fees represent over 90 percent of loans disbursed 
across FSA’s visited. Given the need to purchase shares and be able to demonstrate the 
ability  to  make  weekly  payments,  FSA’s  do  not  reach  the  poorest  members  of  the 
communities they are in. But they do reach a poorer strata of Kenyans than most other 
types of financial institutions. FSA’s also are in remote market centers that no other 
financial institution would have come to for very many years. 
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Comments  Avg  amount 
borrowed 
School Fees  13  71,600  18  6,000 (range 1,200- 10,000) 
Development (Construction)  6  108,600  27  8000 (range 5,000- 60,000) 
Business  17  197,000  49  6,000 (range 2,000- 40,000) 
Nzambani FSA 
Hospital  4  20,500  5  5,000 
Business      60  Range 20 – 60, 000 
School Fees      20  Range 8 – 10,000 
Farming      5  1 – 2,000 
Investment/ Development      10  Power saw 
Mathima FSA 
Others      5   
Business  8  372,800  84  3 – 36,000, 57% of all 
borrowers 
Farm inputs  4  30,800  7  Fert., dairy meal, agro-chem, 
29% of borrowers 
Hospital  1  5,000  1  5,000 emergency 
Werugha FSA 
Water pump  1  36,000  8  1 borrower 
Business  10  214,800  87  6,000 – 20,000 
School fees  4  32,000  13  8,000 
Business  10  104,000  73  10,000 
School Fees  5  30,000  21  6,000 
Mangunga  FSA 
–Suba               . 
Mbita FSA 
Emergencies - Medical  2  9,000  6  5,000 
Bumula  FSA  - 
Busia 
Business Expansion  7  149,000  82  2,000 – 68,000 
  School Fees  3  32,800  18  7,000 
           
1.Commerce/business 
2.Production i.e. cooking, food 
products,  sewing,  tailoring, 
crafts    
    >= 70 
22 
 
3.Service-based  businesses, 
hair, bicycle repair 
     
6 
 
FINCA  (The 




Agriculture crops & L/stock      2   
 
Village banks have not been able to address the credit needs of rainfed agricultural in the 
areas where they operate. This applied in relatively marginal production environments as 
well as relatively productive cereal producing areas. Many traders were accessing loans 
from  village  banks  as  is  shown  in  the  table  above.  But  as  with  other  types  of  rural 
financial institutions in Kenya the bulk of their loans go to business, followed by school 
fees and medical emergencies.  
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Building Societies 
 
2 institutions survived the purge of domestic financial institutions that followed the 1988-
banking crisis – Equity Building Society, and Family Finance. The Building Societies 
Act allowed limited liability companies with only Ksh 200,000 of share capital to collect 
deposits. A mixture of legislative slowness, regulatory laxity, greed, mismanagement and 
a  desire  to  see  indigenous  Kenyans  owning  banks  led  to  a  surge  in  small  building 
societies and finance houses such as Rural Urban, Prudential, Kenya Finance and a host 
of others that are now part of the history of the Kenyan financial sector.   
 
Equity  Building  Society  started  in  1984  and  survived  the  collapse  of  domestic  and 
indigenous  financial  institutions  in  the  late  1980’s.  Currently  it  is  the  third  largest 
financial institution in Kenya by number of clients - 255,000 that is 12 percent (1 in 8) of 
all Kenyans with bank accounts. Table 8 presents a summary of their 2003 results.  
 
Table 12: Equity Building Society Results 
  2003 Figures  % Change over 2002 
Depositors  252,186  + 62 
Customer Deposits  3.37 billion  + 54 
# of Borrowers  65,145  + 57 
Loans and advances  1.6 billion 
21% return 
+ 43 
Assets  3.9 bn  +52 
Pre Tax Profit  142.7 million  + 29 
Excess Liquidity  2 billion   
     
Government Securities  870 million            
4.3% return 
+ 91 % from 454 million 
Deposits with other Banks  969 million 
2.9% return 
+ 59 % from 611 million 
Return on Equity  29%   
 
Equity has mobilized Ksh 3.37 bn. in savings and deposits. An indication of its outreach 
is the fact that the average account has a balance of less than Ksh 3000. Equity had less 
than 4000 borrowers in 2001. This rose to 40,000 in 2002 and 65,000 in 2003. Much of 
this growth has been driven by a strategic look at what gaps there were in the financial 
market,  and  the  demographics  and  characteristics  of  large  numbers  of  underserved 
clients. To these clients were offered low minimum balances (Ksh 400), no monthly 
charges,  and  access  to  a  variety  of  loan  products  that  were  processed  speedily.  The 
growth in delivering innovative products began the agricultural sector with lending to tea 
farmers against their monthly deliveries or end of year bonus.  
 
Equity has proved a major competitor for SACCO’s in the tea growing areas around Mt. 
Kenya. The competition is fierce for the business of some 360,000 plus small-scale tea 
growers. SACCO’s noted that Equity spent a lot more than they did on marketing.  
 
Equity generates more profit than many far larger financial institutions and is continuing 
on an aggressive growth path. In 2003 it opened 3 new branches. In November Equity  
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opened in Nakuru and had 14,000 new clients in a month. Family Finance also opened a 
branch there around the same time. Equity plans to open in at least Eldoret and Kisumu 
before the end of the year. They are reaching out to many Kenyans that are still searching 
for a financial institution that can meet their needs.  
 
Equity already has benefited from lending to agriculture and states that it is keen to do 
more financing of agriculture. However they point out that for every commodity and 
region the specifics of the marketing systems would demand different loan products. It 
would be unlikely that one model could fit all scenarios. Products for tea and dairy are 
already  developed  but  Equity  sees  difficulties  in  rolling  out  products  for  other 
commodities  due  to  the  costs  related  to  product  development, and the relatively less 
developed marketing systems in the other crops. However they expressed a willingness to  
do agricultural lending on agency basis and feel that no government body could be more 
cost efficient in getting loans and other services to agricultural producers. They say there 
is  room  for  dialogue  and  that  they  would  be  happy  to  discuss  the  modalities  of  a 
government supported agricultural credit facility. 
 
Equity has rolled out a profitable and low cost business model that can make money 
lending an average of Ksh 20,000 per loan. Commercial banks reported that loans of that 
size  were  of  no  interest  to  them  and  set  lower  limits  of  Ksh  50,000.  The  typical 
agricultural  borrower  in  Kenya  would  need  closer  to  Ksh  20,000  than  50,000.  This 
suggests a benchmark for one hallmark of a potentially successful agricultural lender in 
Kenya. The biggest problem for financial institutions like Equity and Family Finance is 
excess liquidity. Despite aggressive advertising campaigns they are finding it difficult to 
find profitable channels for lending. If products could be developed for them to lend 
more to agriculture they could meet a good proportion of the need for agricultural credit 
without the need for government funds. They have deposits adequate to cover a greatly 
expanded loan book.  Government could play a role in encouraging product development 
and underwriting losses incurred while learning to reach farmers.  
 
Equity has been making efforts lend where marketing systems are well developed such as 
in small-holder tea and in dairy. One micro-finance specialist spoken to suggested that 
the best bank for farmers is not a bank, but a functioning marketing system. Such a 
system gives certainty that the produce will be sold, and results in financial institutions 
falling over themselves to serve the needs of the farmers producing the commodity.  
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AFC - The Agricultural Finance Corporation 
 
The  AFC  was  formed  under  Cap  323  in  1963  combining  the  government  programs 
supporting agricultural credit to Europeans and Africans. In 1969 it was reconstituted to 
take over the Land and Agricultural Bank. At its formation AFC’s functions were to 
assist  the  development  of  agriculture  by  making  loans  to  all  farmers,  co-operative 
societies, public bodies, local authorities and any other person involved in the agricultural 
sector. In practice it primarily served the large farm sector while the Cooperative Bank 
targeted the small farm sector (and cooperative commodities).  
 
The 1997 Tegemeo household survey was able to shed some light on the operations of 
AFC in the mid 1990s. Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) gave loans to only one 
percent  of  households  (15  in  random  survey  of  1500  rural  households),  and  was 
responsible for 3.5 percent of the value of actual loans made, implying relatively large 
individual loans. 99 percent of loans were made in 2 of the 9 regions covered - 86 percent 
in the Rift Valley and 13 percent in the Central Highlands. The loans went to large farms 
averaging 19 acres compared to an average farm size of 4.3 acres in the whole sample. 
And loans were made largely to individuals with salaried jobs. 73 percent of those who 
had accessed a loan from AFC had sources of off-farm income. 93 percent of AFC’s 
borrowers used fertilizer and financed its purchase with funds from AFC or off-farm 
sources. The AFC is not serving the credit needs of farmers and its role has been taken 
over by self-finance, and co-operatives. Of all households using fertiliser, 46 percent 
financed the purchase with earnings from farming, 24 percent with off-farm income, and 
16 percent through co-operatives.  
 
AFC’s loan products covered land transfer, cereals (GMR and seasonal credit schemes), 
livestock  and  cash  crop  production,  on-farm  infrastructure,  farm  mechanization, 
agricultural  transport  equipment  and  input  distribution.  Over  the  years  the  branch 
network grew from 6 in 1964 to a peak of 49. Currently there are 30 branches. But 
activity for the last decade has been too low to justify even this reduced infrastructure.   
 
How AFC Came to Where it is Now 
The insurance element of the GMR scheme was abused and exploited in the late 1970’s. 
Politically and/or financially powerful farmers would have their crop declared a failure 
and in return have their production loans written off. Meanwhile their produce would be 
sold,  unencumbered  in  side  markets  or  through  other  names.  Government  and  AFC 
officers were not able to hold these individuals to account, and also participated in and 
benefited from the scam. Government discontinued GMR in 1978. 
 
A New Seasonal Credit Scheme was started in 1980 to replace GMR. By June 1992 the 
non-performing portfolio was Ksh 1.5 billion, 49 percent of the 3.4 bn portfolio. In 1996 
the scheme was suspended due to diminished revolving funds as a result of the build up 
of a huge non-performing portfolio of 6.2 bn on a loan portfolio of 6.8 bn, or 89 percent. 
AFC had been almost literally giving away Ksh 500 million per year for 10 years. 
  
Tegemeo Rural Finance Paper 2004.  28
Government  budgetary  allocations  have  not  been  forthcoming.  Government  was  to 
compensate the corporation for write offs GOK directed AFC to give, including a large 
sum late last year, but stretching back since 1978. Recoveries have gotten worse over 
time. In the year ending June 1996 Ksh 860m was collected. By 2001 this had dropped to 
Ksh 400m and in 2002 only 156m. or Ksh 13m per month. Those who had not benefited 
from the write offs were not paying.  
 
Compounding of interest on arrears is another reason for poor loan repayment and has 
made many loanees give up in the face of huge loans build up of arrears i.e. a loan that 
started as small with a principle of Ksh 500,000 a few years ago now standing at Ksh 8 
million. The new management at AFC has offered concessions on accumulated arrears 
and interest for borrowers who come forward and enter into negotiations to regularize 
their accounts. But some borrowers are not convinced why they should pay when a group 
of wealthy and powerful people had their loans written off completely. 
 
Donor supported loan programs to AFC also have dried up. As a result there has been 
minimal new lending, and the bulk of loan recoveries are used to service running costs, 
particularly payroll that runs to around Ksh 160 million per year. Other running costs are 
budgeted for Ksh 80 million. At the beginning of 2003 AFC held Ksh 250 m of their own 
to lend that was supplemented by Ksh 260 million from government for development 
loans.   Another Ksh 260 million is expected for seasonal credit. 
 
The AFC’s Plan 
In  2002  a  large  number  of  non  performing  loans  were  written  off.  The  process  was 
extremely political and many relatively better off loanees escaped, many relatively poorer 
ones did not. Government ministers, senior politicians and civil servants, dominated the 
list. Disagreements about revealing the list, and who should or should not be on it were 
reported to be part of the reasons for the exit from office of a recent PS in the Ministry of 
Agriculture.  
 
The debt write off, and a new loan concession program are aimed at making more of the 
loan book performing as a means of cleaning the balance sheet to attract new funding 
from government and donors. The corporation has requested the equivalent of Ksh 1.46 
bn per year for the next 5 years (Ksh 7bn) and argues that after that injection of new 
capital it will be self-sustaining.   
 
With current running costs of Ksh 160 m for 520 staff and Ksh 80 m for operations per 
year AFC requires Ksh 250m per year to run in its current form. This would require a 
loan  book  of  Ksh  2.5bn  at  their  advertised  10  percent  interest  rate  to  be  sustained. 
Operating costs of Ksh 200, 000 per branch per month appear adequate. The wage bill 
would need to rise if new lending operations to be commenced and also need to fund a 
retrenchment program although natural attrition has reduced staff numbers significantly. 
AFC is short of key cadres i.e. loan officers and recently advertised for a large number of 
new  staff,  probably  on  the  strength  of  government  promises  to  do  something  about 
reviving the institution.  
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Currently AFC has loanable funds of their own amounting to Ksh 250 m. In response to 
pre-election promises to revive AFC government made an initial injection of KSh 260 m 
for farm development, followed by a similar amount for seasonal credit for a total of  
 Ksh 520m. AFC needs a Ksh 2 bn injection of some form quite soon if they are not to 
continue to require government subventions. Demand for AFC loans does not appear to 
be a problem. Staff report that current loan applications for the Ksh 260 of development 
loans advanced by government stand at Ksh 3.5bn. Demand for seasonal credit is yet to 
be ascertained but staff suggest that total loan demand is in the region of Ksh 10 bn per 
year.  
 
AFC is also looking for ways of being shielded from politicians and political/government 
interference. Conversations with staff indicate that they see political interference and 
liberalization as their biggest problems.  Staff talked to propose that since agricultural 
lending is risky, government must shoulder the costs of the operation for the foreseeable 
future. They are do not seem keen on proposals about privatizing, or becoming a deposit 
taking institution.  
 
Options For AFC 
The government has a number of choices as to what to do with the AFC. 
1.  Government pump in the Ksh 7 bn they have requested as it would strengthen balance 
sheet and may attract concessional donor funding. Does not address the fundamental 
reasons for the high default rates – 15 times higher than in the rest of the rural finance 
industry and 2.5 times that in the poorly performing banking sector. 
2.  Government inject Ksh 2 bn. 
3.  Government assist AFC to access concessional lines of credit 
4.  Convert AFC into a deposit taking agricultural bank. 
5.  Close down AFC. 
6.  Become  a  wholesaler  of  money  with  retail  functions  undertaken  by  commercial 
banks, building societies and SACCOs that already dominate the rural areas and have 
developed sustainable systems of disbursing credit and keeping default rates low.  
 
This paper has already shown that no institution in Kenya has really perfected lending to 
normal agriculture per se and most of their loans go to school fees, business development 
and building houses or commercial premises. The typical agricultural portfolio in the 
range of Kenyan financial institutions is around 2 percent. And most of this money is 
used as consumer credit or is advances against regular or lump sum payments for tea and 
milk. 
 
These institutions in some areas and at some times of the year are short of loanable funds 
and SACCO’s in particular have been borrowing from commercial banks - Co-operative, 
Stanbic, KCB, Standard Chartered, K-Rep. 
 
Most rural based financial institutions suggested that they would be willing to manage 
special products on behalf of government and suggested that AFC could never match 
their  systems  and  efficiency.  The  extra  costs  and  risks  of  running a tied agricultural 
program would have to be covered by the sponsor. Institutions also pointed out that each  
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commodity and marketing system probably will need a different loan design that would 
be difficult for a bureaucratic national organization to handle. Institutions spoken to also 
pointed out that if they were to handle government funds they would not like it to be 
widely known, or for it to look very different from their other products as delinquency 
rates would rise across their entire loan portfolio.  
 
Looking at the way forward, and beyond AFC there is need to recognize that the rural 
sector has been able to mobilize large amounts of funds with shares, deposits and loans  
running to hundreds of millions. Dividends are paid on shares implying that players are 
able to undertake their current operations at a profit. Rural SACCOs probably are holding 
Ksh 20 billion and are serving 500,000 borrowers and more savers. All SACCOS have 
66bn in deposits, 1,000,000 borrowers. Post Office has 10 bn saved and 2 million active 
accounts. NGO’s have about 200,000 clients nationwide, Building societies 250,000, K-
Rep and Co-op Bank about 50,000 each.  The question for policy is whether AFC is 
really  being  missed,  or  whether  the  problem  is  more  one  of  the  lack  of  agriculture 
friendly products and whether this problem needs an agriculture focused institution to 
address it. 
 
Many institutions already have products that advance money against the annual tea bonus 
getting around the problem of needing to make regular payments that is difficult for 
agricultural borrowers. Others are thinking about trying new ways of reaching farmers. 
The  need  now  is  to  understand  better  the  process  of  product  innovation  and  how  to 
encourage it, perhaps even subsidizing product development and experimentation, rather 
than subsidizing a particular institution or its relatively well off clients. Such a process 
would be far cheaper, and much more beneficial, and potentially reaching more of the 
right type of clients than AFC, as currently structured, can ever hope to.  
 
AFC is currently undertaking a strategic planning process. 
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Policy Issues Facing Rural Financial Services In Kenya 
 
Numerous and confusing ways of calculating interest rates were encountered during the 
course of this study. Some institutions were charging monthly interest rates calculated on 
a flat rate basis. This was most common among small village banks and NGO’s making 
small loans to business people. Rates charged were as high as 8 percent per month for a 
first time borrower. However over time these maximum rates have come down to the 
range of 4 to 6 percent per month due to competition and lack of demand for loans when 
rates are that high. It was notable that village banks could start with very high rates, but 
after a year or two were faced with excess cash and the need to generate more demand for 
loans through reduced interest rates.   
 
The actual cost of money implied by rates of even 5 percent per month is 193 percent on 
an annual basis. However typically such loans were for small amounts for about four 
months. These loans, typically under Ksh 5,000, are the preserve of quite poor people, 
but beyond the reach of the poorest in all the areas visited. The relatively poor pay fairly 
high interest rates, but the absolutely poor have no access at all.   
 
Table 10 overleaf shows the different cost of money across institutions encountered. The 
range is from 193 percent in a new small village bank, down to 14 percent in the car 
loans market where rates are based on a flat rate, or in the corporate market where large 
firms pay near the advertised base rate, minimal charges and on a reducing balance basis.  
However  the  best  offer  is  from  AFC  that  is  only  beaten  by  an  offer  of  5.5  percent 
financing, fixed rate, (10.15% reducing) introductory offer from a local car dealer in 
conjunction with their bank.  
 
Fixed rate loans return interest charges ranging from 193 to 14 percent. Reducing balance 
loans ranged from 65 to 12 percent. Kenya has a segmented credit market where such 
wide variations suggest market failure. And dealing with market failure is a legitimate 
role for the state, even where, as in Kenya, the state was responsible for the segmented 
market, market failure, in the first place.    
 
Before MFI’s, SACCOS, and village banks and similar institutions came up the market 
was  even  more  segmented  than  it  is  today.  The  vast  majority  of  enterprises  and 
individuals currently accessing credit through these institutions had no access at all to the 
financial system. The picture depicted overleaf is a half full glass, not an empty one. 
Things have improved through the efforts of hundreds of individuals, donors, institutions 
that  have been promoting micro-finance in Kenya. Unfortunately too many Kenyans, 
particularly small-scale producers of most agricultural commodities are still out in the 
cold. This should be the new thrust of funding and innovation in the financial market in 
Kenya.  
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Table 13.  Interest Rates and the Actual Cost of Money  in Kenya 
 
Fixed Rate                            
  VB Start  VBk Hi FOSA  VBnk Lo NGO  NGO II Bnk 1  Bank II Bk+TSC Car 
LOAN  100,000  100,000 100,000  100,000 100,000  100,000 100,000  100,000 100,000 100,000 
int rate/Mth  1.08  1.05 1.05  1.03 0.03  1.15 1.65  1.5 1.25 0.583 
Int rate /year            19.80  18.00 15.00 7.00 
int rate mth  8  5 5  3 3  1.5 1.65  1.50 1.25 0.58 
Charges  600  600 300  600 600  20,600 2,500  2,000 2,500 0 
Net L  99400  99,400 99,700  99,400 99,400  79,400 97,500  98,000 97,500 100,000 
                       
Avg Loan  49700  49,700 49,850  49,700 49,700  39,700 48,750  49,000 48,750 50,000 
Total Int  96,000  60,000 60,000  36,000 36,000  18,000 19,800  18,000 15,000 7,000 
16 Week  32,000                   
12 month  1.932  1.207 1.204  0.724 0.724  0.453 0.406  0.367 0.308 0.140 
                       
                       
Reducing Balance                    
    VBnk Hi  VBnk Lo NGO  BS US BS S  Corp City New AFC 
LOAN        100,000  100,000 100,000  100,000 100,000  100,000 100,000 100,000 
Int rate/Mth    1.05  1.03 1.5   1.5  1.5 1.083  
Int rate /year        18  18 18  18 13 10 
Int rate mth    5  3 1.5           
Charges      600  600 10,396  10,396 3,396  3,000 0 10,000 
Net L      99,400  99,400 89,604  89,604 96,604  97,000 100,000 90,000 
                       
Avg Loan      49,700  49,700 44,802  44,802 48,302  48,500 50,000 50,000 
Total Int      32,500  19,500 9,750  9,750 9,750  7,041 7,042 5,417 
12 month        0.654  0.392 0.218  0.218 0.202  0.145 0.141 0.12 
Key: VB Start is the first laon in a village bank, VBk Hi is a high cost Village Bank, Lo is a lower cost one. Bnk I,II are commercial banks, + TSC is loans too teachers – TSC employees.  
BS US and S is unsecured and secured facilities at a Building Society, Corp and City are deals between city companies and commercial banks, City is the corporate. New AFC is the current offer from 
the Agricultural Finance Corporation that is bound to elicit excess demand.  
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Figure 1 shows the Annual Percentage Rate equivalents for loans quoted on flat rate or 
reducing balance basis. A loan at 10 percent flat rate is equivalent to 18 percent on 
reducing balance basis.  In a number of countries policy has increased transparency in 
lending  rates  and  charges  with  different  methods  of  calculation  by  demanding  that 
financial institutions prominently inform potential clients of the actual cost of the money 
they are borrowing. APR makes it easier for consumers to compare across lenders. The 
Central Bank of Kenya has begun to improve consumer information by publishing bank 
charges and interest rates in the press. However some of the hidden charges are not clear 
from those tabulations.  
 
On the policy front a number of threads are coming together at the same time and giving 
the opportunity for a reevaluation of the rural financial services market. On the regulatory 
and legislative side government has 3 bills and an existing Act that can form the basis of 
finding a way forward.  
 
The Micro-Finance Bill proposes to allow groups able to raise Ksh 60 million of share 
capital and a series of other prudential and management standards that continue to be 
negotiated, to take deposits from the public. Regulation would be by a body separate 
from  the  Central  Bank.  However  CBK  would  be  wiling  to  be  on  the  board  of  that 
regulatory body. Regulation and a clear legal framework for deposit-taking MFI’s, it is 
hoped, will attract funds from private investors, and more business from wary depositors.  
 
Regulation  and  prudential  standards  also  would  allow  the  development  of  deposit 
protection for MFI depositors. Currently in Kenya it is the relatively wealthy who can 
afford to bank at a commercial bank who are afforded deposit protection. There is no 
deposit protection where the poor do their banking. The industry anticipates that clear 
prudential  and  reporting  standards  under  a  regulatory  body  would  remove  potential  
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opportunists who can sully the name of the entire MFI industry. However the current 
draft MFI bill would do little to increase the access of agricultural producers to credit.  
 
The draft Cooperative Societies Bill proposes a regulatory body for SACCOs. Another 
draft  SACCO  Bill  from  the  same  ministry  also  proposes  a  SACCO regulatory body. 
SACCO’s have played a large role in increasing access to financial services in both urban 
and  rural  areas.  However  not  enough  work  has  been  done  in  examining  whether  2 
separate regulators are needed. There are also questions about the number of MFI’s and 
SACCO’s that would want to convert to new institutional forms proposed in the draft 
legislation.  
 
Government has already made a policy move in this area through the reducing of the 
minimum  capital  requirement  for  a  commercial  banking  licence  to  Ksh  200  million. 
Many of the Co-ops visited would easily qualify if they so wished. A banking licence 
brings strict financial and reporting standards, as well as deposit protection and more 
credibility with depositors. Around the world some of the largest banks trace their origins 
to cooperatives. Within Kenya, Equity Building Society has been invited to apply for a 
banking licence but is yet to proceed. And it is not clear that a number of the larger MFI’s 
really want to take deposits other than the forced savings that are part of their current 
operations.  
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Conclusion 
Agriculture sector stakeholders have not been part of the emerging debate about how to 
avail financial services to rural Kenyans. Farmers are particularly disadvantaged because 
advances  have  been  made  in  developing  products  for  rural  businesses,  but  not  for 
agriculture. The new government pledged to make credit available to farmers and moved 
to examine the possibilities for reintroducing Guaranteed Minimum Returns and funding  
AFC as a means of implementing this pledge. This paper has shown that the rural finance 
sector is far broader than the AFC. It has also shown that industry players and even 
innovators have yet to design products that reach the bulk of agricultural producers. 
 
Players in the rural finance sector can see the need, and business potential, of lending to 
the largest sector of the economy. But despite the many different institutions, institutional 
forms and products, difficulties in the product markets, and problems with the regulatory 
framework has slowed product development. Government can play a more proactive role 
in advancing dialogue and underwriting product development in the agricultural credit 
sector.  The  focus  should  go  far  beyond  a  single  government  owned  institution  that 
provides subsidized credit to a few large farmers.  
 
Global experiences and best practices should be part of that examination, as well as the 
potential for insurance arrangements to reduce the risks of lending to rainfed agriculture. 
And donor support of the type Uganda is receiving targeting the development of products 
and  institutions  to  serve  agriculture  should  be  sought.  The  Strategy  for  Revitalizing 
Agriculture suggests that the agriculture related ministries should take more interest in 
national  debates  about  the  evolution  of  the  countries  financial  system  to  ensure  that 
agriculture does not spend more decades starved of financial services.  The preparation of 
a policy and sessional paper on agricultural finance could be a useful way forward, and 
could be a framework within which government decides many of the issues raised above, 
including the future of AFC.  
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